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PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Frank L. Maraist*
APPEALS

A not uncommon occurrence is the perfection of an appeal
from an oral statement of judgment prior to the signing of a
written judgment. If no signed judgment appears in the record
the appellate court will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.' However, where the judgment is signed after perfection
of the appeal, a different problem is presented since there is a
basis for jurisdiction but technically no appeal from the signed
judgment. Resolution of the problem produced a split among
the intermediate appellate courts. The First2 and Third 3 Cir-

cuits held that the appeal should be dismissed, even though
dismissal would preclude any appeal if the delay for appeal
from the signed judgment had expired, while the Fourth4 and
Second Circuits maintained the appeals. The Second Circuit
in Nomey v. Department of Highways5 fashioned the test that
the appeal should be maintained if 1) the judgment is signed
at a point close in time to the oral statement of the judgment;
2) the judgment as signed is not substantially different from
the oral judgment; and 3) the adverse party is not prejudiced
and is given fair notice of the aim and purpose of the appeal.'
In Palmer v. Wren7 the First Circuit dismissed an appeal,' but
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Rourke v. Coursey, 334 So. 2d 480 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); DiSalvo v. Picard,
303 So. 2d 900 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); Mestyer v. Mestyer, 302 So. 2d 342 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1974); Rhodes v. J-W Operating Co., 247 So. 2d 657 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
2. Malbrough v. Kiff, 312 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
3. Forman v. May, 201 So. 2d 683 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
4. Richardson v. Richardson, 264 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); American
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Ramon, 204 So. 2d 798 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
5. 325 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
6. Id. at 733.
7. 361 So. 2d 1206 (La. 1978).
8. No. 12,145 (La. App. 1st Cir. May 1, 1978) (decision is noted "not for publication").
*
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the supreme court granted writs' and reinstated the appeal,
commenting that "Nomey . .. has correctly decided this
issue." ° The Nomey test appears to be a common-sense balancing of the equities between the opposing parties, especially
in light of the prevailing Louisiana policy favoring appeals."
While one may share Justice Summers' concern, expressed in
a concurrence,' 2 over the court's practice of deciding cases
through per curiam opinions on grants of writs, without hearings, it is difficult to find fault with the result in Palmer.
The supreme court also passed upon the issue of reinstatement of an appeal. In Jasmin v. Gafney, Inc.,' after the trial
court had granted plaintiff a judgment for workmen's compensation benefits and the defendant had appealed, counsel for the
litigants agreed upon a settlement. Defendant then dismissed
the appeal with prejudice, alleging settlement, but the motion
did not state that the plaintiff-appellee concurred in the dismissal. When the plaintiff balked at completion of the compromise, defendant filed a rule to make the original judgment
executory, or, alternatively, to reinstate the appeal. The supreme court reversed the Third Circuit'4 judgment reinstating
the appeal with the observation that there is no legal authority
for the reinstatement of an appeal.'" While the decision appears
harsh, it probably will have limited effect. In most cases, the
agreement to compromise will be enforceable and will give rise
to a new action;'" in workmen's compensation cases, however,
settlement requires court approval" and there can be no binding compromise until the formalities are complied with.'" Forewarned by the decision, however, prudent counsel will not dismiss an appeal until settlement has been effected.
9. 361 So. 2d 1206 (La. 1978).
10. Id.
11. Emmons v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 245 La. 411, 158 So. 2d 594 (1963); Succession of Videau, 228 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
12. 361 So. 2d at 1206.
13. 357 So. 2d 539 (La. 1978).
14. 350 So. 2d 281 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
15. 357 So. 2d at 541.
16. LA. R.S. 23:1271 (Supp. 1966); Meinerz v. Treybig, 245 So. 2d 557 (La. App.
3d Cir.), cert. denied, 258 La. 580, 247 So. 2d 395 (1971).
17. LA. R.S. 23:1272 (Supp. 1974).
18. LA. CiV. CODE art. 3071 provides that a settlement must be in writing.

1979]

WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1977-1978

905

The judgment of a trial court overruling an exception is
rarely reviewed by an appellate court prior to appeal from final
judgment;" the appellate courts consistently hold that the
overruling of an exception does not cause the "irreparable injury" necessary to provoke an interlocutory appeal ° or to merit
discretionary review through supervisory writs." In many
cases, however, the erroneous overruling of an exception results
in an unnecessary trial on the merits. While the appellate
courts generally have disregarded the unfairness to the defendant in such cases, the Fourth Circuit in Mangin v. Auter 2
indicated its willingness to grant writs where the unfairness
and judicial inefficiency are clear. In Mangin the trial judge
overruled a peremptory exception urging liberative prescription; on review by a five-judge panel, the Fourth Circuit upheld
the three-judge panel's prior decision to grant the writ. The
court stressed that the exception had been tried on undisputed
facts, appeared meritorious on its face, and would, if sustained,
terminate the litigation.2 3 The court's decision is laudable, but
it does not herald any abandonment of the general rule that
interlocutory judgments overruling exceptions will not be reviewed prior to trial on the merits. In most cases, the manner
in which the exception should be disposed of is not clear, and
when the exception eventually is found to be without merit, the
resulting delay and additional expense of a "piecemeal" trial
impose an undesirable burden upon the plaintiff and the appel19. Examples of cases where review of interlocutory appeal was granted are:
Batson v. Time, Inc., 298 So. 2d 100 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 299 So. 2d 803
(La. 1974); Jennings v. Coleman, 250 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); Molero v.
Bass, 190 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 250 La. 2, 193 So. 2d 523
(1967); Osborn Funeral Home, Inc. v. La. State B'd of Embalmers, 162 So. 2d 596 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1964).
20. See, e.g., Alex Theriot, Jr., Inc. v. Lager, Inc.; 345 So. 2d 1263 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1977); Waters v. Waters, 264 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Alexander v.
Hancock Bank, 241 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Lounsberry v. Hoffpauir, 199
So. 2d 553 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Voisin v. Luke, 203 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1967); Bryant v. X-L Finance Co., 166 So. 2d 377 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); Gierczic v.
Gierczic, 150 So. 2d 84 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 244 La. 219, 151 So. 2d 692
(1963).
21. Stevens v. Patterson Menhaden Corp., 191 So. 2d 692 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 250 La. 5, 193 So. 2d 524 (1967).
22. 360 So. 2d 577 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
23. Id. at 578.
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late courts. Under the circumstances of the instant case, however, the result seems proper, and the case and its rationale
reinforce the argument that these types of decisions always
should be discretionary. 4 Since discretionary review is always
available under the writ power, 9 the codal provision granting
appeal of right from interlocutory judgments causing irreparable harm26 arguably is superfluous.
ArrACHMENT

In Bowers v. D. C. Greene27 the Third Circuit held that a
writ of attachment based upon a defendant's nonresidency may
be maintained even though the defendant is personally served
within the state. The decision of the court was based upon two
early cases interpreting article 240 of the Code of Practice28 and
the conclusion that article 3502 of the Code of Civil Procedure
made no change in the law." The effect of the decision, permitting seizure of the assets of a defendant before he has been
given notice and an opportunity to be heard, illustrates that
nonresident attachment may be subject to two constitutional
infirmities. Where nonresident attachment is invoked as a
means of obtaining jurisdiction, the seizure may violate due
process unless there is a sufficient relationship between the
property, the debtor, the debt and the state in which seizure
occurs to make it reasonable for jurisdiction to be exercised in
that manner. 0 It may also be constitutionally infirm because
there is insufficient urgency or judicial control to satisfy the
"fair notice and opportunity to be heard" requirements of due
31

process.

24. See Greater Tangipahoa Utility Co. v. City of Hammond, 247 So. 2d 410 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1971).
25. LA. CONST. art. V, § 10.
26.

LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2083.

27. 360 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
28. Roper v. Brooks, 201 La. 135, 9 So. 2d 485 (1942); Poulan v. Gallagher, 147
So. 723 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933).
29. 360 So. 2d at 641.
30. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
31. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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CLASS ACTIONS.

The Code of Civil Procedure permits maintenance of a
class action if 1) the parties are so numerous that joinder is
impracticable; 2) the plaintiff adequately represents the class;
and 3) "the character of the right sought to be enforced for or
against the members of the class is . . .common to all members of the class . ...
",3 The latter requirement, not further

defined by the Code, has been the focal point of dispute over
utilization of the class action in Louisiana. Early decisions by
intermediate appellate courts concluded that the character of
the rights were common when either the members of the class
were indispensable parties or they were necessary parties.33 In
Stevens v. Board of Trustees3 a three-man majority of the
court provided a potential springboard for expanded use of the
class action device; the opinion rejected the notion that the
''commonality" concept in the class action was limited by the
joinder concepts of indispensable and necessary parties. 5 Instead, the rights of the members of the class have sufficient
connection, and thus the class action is available, if they share
a common question of law or fact and a policy decision justifies
the maintenance of a class action. 3 The policies to which the
majority alluded were judicial efficiency, fairness to the parties, and the potential for utilizing the class action as a method
of implementing substantive legislative policy. 7
The Stevens rationale was extended in the last term to
permit the use of the class action in litigation of a "mass tort."
In Williams v. State38 five inmates filed a class action to recover
damages on behalf of approximately 600 inmates who allegedly
were served contaminated food at the state penitentiary. The
four-man majority of the court concluded that where the pro32. LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 591-92.
33. Stevens v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 295 So. 2d 36 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1974); Caswell v. Reserve Nat'l Ins. Co., 234 So. 2d 250 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 256 La. 364, 236 So. 2d 499 (1970); Veal v. Preferred Thrift & Loan of
New Orleans, Inc., 234 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
34. 309 So. 2d 144 (La. 1975). Justice Dixon was recused.
35. Id. at 147, 149.
36. Id. at 147, 150-51.
37. Id. at 151.
38. 350 So. 2d 130 (La. 1977).
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posed class action involves numerous minor claims arising out
of a single incident in which the claimants sustained similar
injuries and damages, small in nature, the trial judge should
certify it as a class action.
The majority of the court also spoke to the difficult issue
of notice to absent members of the class. Federal due process
requires that in the early stages of a class action, all identifiable prospective members of the class must be given reasonable
notice of the pendency of the action and an opportunity to
withdraw from the class; 3 however, the Code of Civil Procedure
makes no provision for notice. The majority concluded that the
inherent power of Louisiana courts includes the power to pro40
vide for reasonable notice to absent members of the class.
While the question of the type of notice was relegated to further
proceedings, the majority pointed out that due process does not
mandate formal service of process; while individual written
notice may be required for claims of any magnitude, notice by
publication may satisfy the requirements of due process in
some cases. 4' Stevens and Williams were strong cases for certification of the class action. In Stevens the common questions
of law and fact were the only significant disputed issues in the
case. In Williams judicial efficiency was attained by combining
litigation of 600 small claims, and state substantive policy was
promoted by assuring that wrongful conduct producing negligible damage claims to a large number of victims would be deterred through the civil judicial process. Where the claims of
class members present different factual backgrounds and different questions of liability or damages, it is arguable that the
2
class action should not be sanctioned.
COURT COSTS

The Code of Civil Procedure permits a litigant to prosecute
a claim without pre-payment of costs if he is "unable to pay
the costs . . . because of his poverty and lack of means
39. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
40. 350 So. 2d at 138..
41. Id.
42. But see State ex rel. Guste v. General Motors Corp., No. 61,840 (La. Sup.
Ct. Rehearing April 9, 1979).
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. .. .,The terms "poverty" and "lack of means" are nebulous standards, and the Code furnishes no other test for courts
to apply in determining whether a litigant should be relieved
of the burden of pre-payment of costs. The appellate courts
generally have left the matter to the discretion of the trial
judges, rarely overruling their decisions." In Benjamin v. National Super Markets, Inc.' 5 the supreme court reaffirmed this
practice but set forth guidelines to aid a judge in the exercise
of his discretion. The court first noted that it is not the litigant's income but "what happens to the money that comes in"
which determines the question of indigency. 5 It thus concluded
that a litigant earning approximately $1,200 per month was not
disqualified from proceeding in forma pauperis where his
monthly expenses amounted to a substantially larger sum. Nor
did the plaintiff's ownership of certain assets preclude use of
forma pauperis; a litigant should not be required to dispose of
his equity in a modest family home and furniture, or a modest
automobile essential for family transportation, to pay advance
court costs. 7 Reasserting that appellate courts should not disturb the decision of the trial judge in such a matter in the
absence of clear abuse of discretion,4 8 the supreme court reversed the Fourth Circuit, which had overruled a trial court
order permitting an appeal in forma pauperis.
DIRECT ACTIONS

By its terms, the Louisiana direct action statute applies to
liability policies written outside the state if the accident giving
rise to the action occurs within Louisiana.49 In the landmark
43. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 5181.
44. McCoy v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 339 So. 2d 976 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976), rev'd
on other grounds, 345 So. 2d 1175 (La. 1977); Houston v. Brown, 292 So. 2d 911 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1974); Bodcaw Co. v. Enterkin, 273 So. 2d 325 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
45. 351 So. 2d 138 (La. 1977).
46. Id. at 140.
47. Id. at 141. For this proposition the court cited: Gilmore v. Rachl, 202 La. 652,
12 So. 2d 669 (1943); Fils v. Iberia, St. M & E. R. Co., 145 La. 544, 82 So. 697 (1919);
Roy v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 307 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
48. 351 So. 2d at 142.
49. LA. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1962).
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case of Webb v. Zurich" the supreme court extended the coverage of the statute to an accident occurring outside the state
where the insurance policy was delivered in the state. The
court's sweeping language in Webb gave rise to speculation
that the statute might also apply to an accident occurring outside the state on a policy written outside the state, if there were
other contacts with Louisiana sufficient to make it constitutionally permissible to apply Louisiana law. The speculation
was laid to rest by the supreme court's decision in Esteve v.
Allstate Insurance Co." There, the court held that the extension of the statute in Webb represents the outer limits of the
reach of the direct action statute, and, accordingly, the statute
is available only if the policy is issued in Louisiana or the
accident occurs in Louisiana."
DIScOVERY
Sonnier5

the trial court ordered a personal
In Viator v.
injury plaintiff to submit to examination by three physicians,
to postpone scheduled surgery for two weeks and to permit
observers and filming of the surgery. The court's order also
provided that the sanction for non-compliance with the order
would be the rejection at the trial of any evidence of the surgery. The Third Circuit, analogizing from Federal Rule 35(a)
and cases thereunder, concluded that article 1464 of the Code
of Civil Procedure gives the judge authority to order examinations of the injured party by three physicians when the examinations are justified by the circumstances." However, the appellate court rejected the contention that the trial judge was
authorized by Louisiana discovery law to permit observers or
filming of the surgery or to order a party to postpone surgery
which had been recommended by a physician.5
The court also was critical of the trial court's action in
specifying in the order compelling discovery the penalty for
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

251
351
Id.
355
Id.
Id.

La. 558, 205 So. 2d 398 (1967).
So. 2d 117 (La. 1977).
at 120.
So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
at 1093.
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non-compliance. When a party fails to comply with an order
compelling physical examination, article 1471 of the Code of
Civil Procedure authorizes the court to impose sanctions,
"unless the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to
produce such person for examination." The court reasoned that
by incorporating the sanction into the order, the court denied
a party the right to explain his failure."
EXCEPIONS

If a petition alleges a single set of facts and seeks only one
type of relief thereon under a single theory of liability, and the
defendant contends that the plaintiff may not recover as a
matter of law, the defendant may properly resist the demand
through the peremptory exception urging no cause of action."
What if the plaintiff seeks two different types of relief or the
same relief under two or more theories of liability and the defendant contends that plaintiff may recover, as a matter of law,
one, but not both types of relief, or under one, but not both
theories? May he then urge his objection to the improper theory
or demand through the peremptory exception urging no cause
of action? The Louisiana jurisprudence is that if the petition
does state a cause of action as to one of the theories or one of
the demands for relief, the exception of no cause of action
should not be maintained.18 The evil in maintaining such an
exception is that the judgment rendered thereon becomes immediately appealable, resulting in a "piecemeal" trial of
claims based upon the same facts. An illustration of the rule is
Walker v. Western Southern Life Ins. Co.," in which plaintiff
sued his insurer for disability benefits and for damages for
mental anguish, humiliation and inconvenience resulting from
the failure to pay the benefits. The trial judge sustained defendant's exception of no cause of action to the demand for the
nonpecuniary damages, but on appeal the Second Circuit reversed, pointing out that the use of the exception to strike an
56.

Id. at 1094.

57. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 927.
58. Louisiana & Ark. Ry. Co. v. Goslin, 258 La. 530, 246 So. 2d 852 (1971), appeal
after remand, 300 So. 2d 483 (La. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 963 (1975).
59. 361 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
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element of claimed damages is an improper use of the procedural device."0
The Second Circuit did not point out how the defendant
should have objected to an improper demand or an invalid
theory of recovery. The proper procedure apparently would
have been a motion to strike," but use of that device would
pose problems. One such problem is the limited time period
within which such a motion may be urged. 2 Another is the
possibility that a judgment sustaining a motion to strike may
be appealable,13 thus producing the same piecemeal litigation
which prompted courts to prohibit the use of the peremptory
exception urging a partial no cause of action. Perhaps a more
satisfactory solution, suggested by Judge Lemmon of the
Fourth Circuit,"' is:
"to overrule the exception and to admit evidence
[relevant to the theory or demand which the trial judge
has found insufficient] . . . only by means of a proffer.
Then, after completion of the trial on the merits, the appeal, if any appeal is ever taken, would present all issues
at one time. 5
EXECUTORY PROCESS

Articles 2635 and 2636 of the Code of Civil Procedure require a plaintiff seeking executory process to submit with his
petition the note "evidencing the obligation secured by the
mortgage" sought to be enforced. Where the plaintiff seeks to
enforce a collateral mortgage by executory process, dispute exists over whether the collateral mortgage note or the "hand
note" which it secures is the note evidencing the obligation
secured by the mortgage. A body of jurisprudence is developing
60. Id. at 894.
61.

LA. CODE CMV.P. art. 964.

62. A motion to strike must be filed within ten days of service of the pleading; a
defendant may move to strike within fifteen days of the service of the petition. LA.
CODE CIv. P. art. 964.
63.

See LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 1841, 2083.

64. Tano Corp. v. Louisiana Health Service & Indem. Co., 355 So. 2d 604 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1978) (Lemmon, J., concurring).
65. 355 So. 2d at 607 (emphasis by the court).
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which holds that the collateral mortgage note is the evidence
of the obligation which must be produced."
JURY TRIALS

In St. Pierre v. General American TransportationCorp. 7
the trial judge submitted a personal injury action to the jury
on special interrogatories, beginning with the question whether
plaintiff was contributorily negligent. After judgment for defendant, plaintiff appealed, and a majority of the Fourth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the plaintiff was not prejudiced
by the order in which the interrogatories were presented; even
if there was prejudice, the plaintiff waived the right to urge the
matter on appeal because he failed to object to the order of the
interrogatories before the jury retired. 8 The concurring judge
felt that "had the proper defendants been sued" the order in
which the interrogatories were presented was "so essentially
foreign to the traditional analysis of negligence . . . that...
justice would require a reversal."66
The practice of reserving objection to jury charges until
after the jury has retired, permitted in some areas of the state,
received appellate scrutiny during the 1977-78 term. Noting
that article 1793 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a prerequisite to appellate review of jury charges, requires that objection
to the charges be made before the jury retires, the Fourth Circuit" concluded that counsel may not assert as error allegedly
erroneous charges to which objection is made after the jury has
retired, even though the parties stipulate to that method of
procedure. Four justices of the supreme court, concurring in a
denial of writs because the error was harmless, expressed the
view that where counsel agree to delay objections until after the
66. See Fuller v. Underwood, 355 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978); Tri-South
Mortgage Investors v. New Communities, Inc., 353 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 1052 (La. 1978). See also Cameron Brown South, Inc. v. East
Glen Oaks, Inc., 341 So. 2d 450 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), in which the court recognized
that the "hand note" represents the indebtedness but held that the collateral mortgage
note is the "instrument evidencing the obligation secured by the mortgage."
67. 360 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
68. Id. at 597-98.
69. Id. at 599 (Garsaud, J., concurring).
70. Outlaw v. Bituminous Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 1350 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

jury has retired, it is error for an appellate court to refuse to
consider objections to the charges.7"
RES JUDICATA

In 1976 the supreme court sounded the death knell for
estoppel by judgment (collateral estoppel) in Louisiana,72 and
73 the court
in 1978, in Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation,
formally interred the doctrine. Welch arose when plaintiff, injured in the course of his employment, brought suit against the
independent contractor whom he alleged to be his statutory
employer. After plaintiff was successful in the trial court, the
appellate court reversed,7 4 finding that the plaintiff had failed
to introduce admissible evidence establishing that the contractor was his statutory employer. Plaintiff then brought suit
against the owner, alleging that he was a statutory employee
of both the contractor and the owner. The trial court sustained
exceptions of prescription, peremption and res judicata, and
the First Circuit affirmed on the exception of peremption, not
reaching the plea of res judicata. 5 The supreme court held that
the claim was not barred by prescription and concluded that
the prior judgment did not bar relitigation. The court had little
difficulty in finding that Louisiana's limited doctrine of res
judicata did not bar relitigation; the contractor was not a party
to the first suit, and since res judicata requires an identity of
parties, that doctrine was inapplicable.7 6 The court, speaking
through Justice Dixon, had even less difficulty with the doctrine of collateral estoppel, stating that the device was "a doctrine of issue preclusion alien to Louisiana law."77 Although
Justice Dixon alluded to the difficulty of applying common law
collateral estoppel in Louisiana because of the difference between the civil law concept of "cause" and the common law
71. 359 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1978).
72. Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d 287 (La. 1976).
73. 359 So. 2d 154 (La. 1978).
74. Welch v. Robert Campbell, Inc., 316 So. 2d 822 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 321 So. 2d 523 (La. 1975).
75. 351 So. 2d 1255 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
76. 359 So. 2d at 156.
77. Id.

19791

WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1977-1978

915

concept of "cause of action" upon which application of collateral estoppel is based, the decision clearly was based upon the
incompatability of a broad common law preclusion device with
Louisiana's limited res judicata. Wrote the court: "The adoption and application of an issue preclusion device which would
broaden the operation of res judicata in Louisiana would subvert the original ideal established by codes."7 8
Justice Dixon then made it clear that it was the court's
intention to finally and fully bury the doctrine of collateral
estoppel. Alluding to prior Louisiana decisions recognizing collateral estoppel, he noted that "no clear understanding of the
application of that doctrine has been developed in the cases or
in legal literature. Therefore, we hold that none of the variations of the common law doctrines of res judicata apply in
Louisiana."7
78. Id.at 157.
79. Id.

